We dont need a scale man
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Tracking Your Weight Loss Progress Without the Scale
Want to start a startup? Get funded by Y Combinator. July One of the most common types of advice we give at Y Combinator is to do things that don't scale. A lot of would-be founders believe that startups either take off or don't.
You build something, make it available, and if you've made a better mousetrap, people beat a path to your door as promised. Or they don't, in which case the market must not exist. There may be a handful that just grew by themselves, but usually it takes some sort of push to get them going. A good metaphor would be the cranks that car engines had before they got electric starters. Once the engine was going, it would keep going, but there was a separate and laborious process to get it going.
Recruit The most common unscalable thing founders have to do at the start is to recruit users manually. Nearly all startups have to. You can't wait for users to come to you. You have to go out and get them. Stripe is one of the most successful startups we've funded, and the problem they solved was an urgent one. If anyone could have sat back and waited for users, it was Stripe.
But in fact they're famous within YC for aggressive early user acquisition. Startups building things for other startups have a big pool of potential users in the other companies we've funded, and none took better advantage of it than Stripe.
At YC we use the term "Collison installation" for the technique they invented. More diffident founders ask "Will you try our beta? When anyone agreed to try Stripe they'd say "Right then, give me your laptop" and set them up on the spot. There are two reasons founders resist going out and recruiting users individually. One is a combination of shyness and laziness. They'd rather sit at home writing code than go out and talk to a bunch of strangers and probably be rejected by most of them.
But for a startup to succeed, at least one founder usually the CEO will have to spend a lot of time on sales and marketing. This can't be how the big, famous startups got started, they think. The mistake they make is to underestimate the power of compound growth. We encourage every startup to measure their progress by weekly growth rate.
After a year you'll have 14, users, and after 2 years you'll have 2 million. You'll be doing different things when you're acquiring users a thousand at a time, and growth has to slow down eventually. But if the market exists you can usually start by recruiting users manually and then gradually switch to less manual methods.
Marketplaces are so hard to get rolling that you should expect to take heroic measures at first. In Airbnb's case, these consisted of going door to door in New York, recruiting new users and helping existing ones improve their listings.
When I remember the Airbnbs during YC, I picture them with rolly bags, because when they showed up for tuesday dinners they'd always just flown back from somewhere. Fragile Airbnb now seems like an unstoppable juggernaut, but early on it was so fragile that about 30 days of going out and engaging in person with users made the difference between success and failure.
That initial fragility was not a unique feature of Airbnb. Almost all startups are fragile initially. And that's one of the biggest things inexperienced founders and investors and reporters and know-it-alls on forums get wrong about them.
They unconsciously judge larval startups by the standards of established ones. They're like someone looking at a newborn baby and concluding "there's no way this tiny creature could ever accomplish anything.
They always get things wrong. It's even ok if investors dismiss your startup; they'll change their minds when they see growth. The big danger is that you'll dismiss your startup yourself. I've seen it happen. I often have to encourage founders who don't see the full potential of what they're building.
Even Bill Gates made that mistake. He returned to Harvard for the fall semester after starting Microsoft.
He didn't stay long, but he wouldn't have returned at all if he'd realized Microsoft was going to be even a fraction of the size it turned out to be. Microsoft can't have seemed very impressive when it was just a couple guys in Albuquerque writing Basic interpreters for a market of a few thousand hobbyists as they were then called , but in retrospect that was the optimal path to dominating microcomputer software. And I know Brian Chesky and Joe Gebbia didn't feel like they were en route to the big time as they were taking "professional" photos of their first hosts' apartments.
They were just trying to survive. But in retrospect that too was the optimal path to dominating a big market. How do you find users to recruit manually? If you build something to solve your own problems , then you only have to find your peers, which is usually straightforward. Otherwise you'll have to make a more deliberate effort to locate the most promising vein of users. The usual way to do that is to get some initial set of users by doing a comparatively untargeted launch, and then to observe which kind seem most enthusiastic, and seek out more like them.
For example, Ben Silbermann noticed that a lot of the earliest Pinterest users were interested in design, so he went to a conference of design bloggers to recruit users, and that worked well. For as long as they could which turned out to be surprisingly long , Wufoo sent each new user a hand-written thank you note.
Your first users should feel that signing up with you was one of the best choices they ever made. And you in turn should be racking your brains to think of new ways to delight them. Why do we have to teach startups this?
Why is it counterintuitive for founders? Three reasons, I think. One is that a lot of startup founders are trained as engineers, and customer service is not part of the training of engineers. You're supposed to build things that are robust and elegant, not be slavishly attentive to individual users like some kind of salesperson. Ironically, part of the reason engineering is traditionally averse to handholding is that its traditions date from a time when engineers were less powerful — when they were only in charge of their narrow domain of building things, rather than running the whole show.
You can be ornery when you're Scotty, but not when you're Kirk. Another reason founders don't focus enough on individual customers is that they worry it won't scale. But when founders of larval startups worry about this, I point out that in their current state they have nothing to lose. Maybe if they go out of their way to make existing users super happy, they'll one day have too many to do so much for. That would be a great problem to have. See if you can make it happen.
And incidentally, when it does, you'll find that delighting customers scales better than you expected. Partly because you can usually find ways to make anything scale more than you would have predicted, and partly because delighting customers will by then have permeated your culture. I have never once seen a startup lured down a blind alley by trying too hard to make their initial users happy.
But perhaps the biggest thing preventing founders from realizing how attentive they could be to their users is that they've never experienced such attention themselves. Their standards for customer service have been set by the companies they've been customers of, which are mostly big ones. Tim Cook doesn't send you a hand-written note after you buy a laptop.
He can't. But you can. That's one advantage of being small: you can provide a level of service no big company can. Experience I was trying to think of a phrase to convey how extreme your attention to users should be, and I realized Steve Jobs had already done it: insanely great.
Steve wasn't just using "insanely" as a synonym for "very. All the most successful startups we've funded have, and that probably doesn't surprise would-be founders.
What novice founders don't get is what insanely great translates to in a larval startup. When Steve Jobs started using that phrase, Apple was already an established company. He meant the Mac and its documentation and even packaging — such is the nature of obsession should be insanely well designed and manufactured.
That's not hard for engineers to grasp. It's just a more extreme version of designing a robust and elegant product. What founders have a hard time grasping and Steve himself might have had a hard time grasping is what insanely great morphs into as you roll the time slider back to the first couple months of a startup's life.
It's not the product that should be insanely great, but the experience of being your user. The product is just one component of that.
For a big company it's necessarily the dominant one. But you can and should give users an insanely great experience with an early, incomplete, buggy product, if you make up the difference with attentiveness. Can, perhaps, but should? Over-engaging with early users is not just a permissible technique for getting growth rolling. For most successful startups it's a necessary part of the feedback loop that makes the product good.
Making a better mousetrap is not an atomic operation. Even if you start the way most successful startups have, by building something you yourself need, the first thing you build is never quite right.
And except in domains with big penalties for making mistakes, it's often better not to aim for perfection initially.
The best scales
When you buy through our links, we may earn money from our affiliate partners. Learn more. Bathroom scales aren't the basic weight readers they used to be. Today's scales offer a much richer user experience, displaying readouts covering everything from body fat percentage, hydration levels, bone density, and, of course, weight. And they're a great addition to anyone's home, no matter if you're working toward specific fitness goals or just want to occasionally weigh yourself.
Most people go into the weight loss process, well, wanting to lose weight. However, if you're just getting started, the scale may be the worst choice for tracking your progress. In fact, your weight may be the least important thing to keep track of. It may seem counter-intuitive, but the scale is better at helping you maintain your weight than it is at helping you lose it. The reason?
Этот звонок будет для Хейла полной неожиданностью. Он запаникует и в конце концов, столкнувшись с группой вооруженных людей, ничего не сможет поделать. После минутного упорства ему придется уступить. Но если я вызову агентов безопасности, весь мой план рухнет, - подумал. Хейл сдавил горло Сьюзан немного сильнее, и она вскрикнула от боли. - Ну что, вы решили. Я ее убиваю.
Стратмор мгновенно взвесил все варианты. Если он позволит Хейлу вывести Сьюзан из шифровалки и уехать, у него не будет никаких гарантий. Они уедут, потом остановятся где-нибудь в лесу.
Нет! - отрезала. - Не думаю, что он знал, что имеет дело с вирусом. Я думаю, он был введен в заблуждение. Бринкерхофф молчал.
Она вдруг начала светиться под кончиком пальца.
Я не могу, - повторила. - Я не могу выйти за тебя замуж. - Она отвернулась.
Раздался выстрел, мелькнуло что-то красное. Но это была не кровь. Что-то другое. Предмет материализовался как бы ниоткуда, он вылетел из кабинки и ударил убийцу в грудь, из-за чего тот выстрелил раньше времени.
А что за файл в ТРАНСТЕКСТЕ? - спросила Сьюзан. - Я, как и все прочие, скачал его с сайта Танкадо в Интернете. АНБ является счастливым обладателем алгоритма Цифровой крепости, просто мы не в состоянии его открыть. Сьюзан не могла не восхититься умом Танкадо. Не открыв своего алгоритма, он доказал АНБ, что тот не поддается дешифровке. Стратмор протянул Сьюзан газетную вырезку.
Я думаю, он собирался оставаться поблизости и вовремя все это остановить. Глядя на экран, Фонтейн увидел, как полностью исчезла первая из пяти защитных стен. - Бастион рухнул! - крикнул техник, сидевший в задней части комнаты. - Обнажился второй щит. - Нужно приступать к отключению, - настаивал Джабба.
- Судя по ВР, у нас остается около сорока пяти минут. Отключение - сложный процесс.
- В трубке воцарилась тишина, и Джабба подумал, что зашел слишком. - Прости меня, Мидж. Я понимаю, что ты приняла всю эту историю близко к сердцу. Стратмор потерпел неудачу.
На нашем рынке вы бы и дня не продержались. - Наличными, прямо сейчас, - сказал Беккер, доставая из кармана пиджака конверт. Я очень хочу домой. Росио покачала головой: - Не могу.
Если твоя проверка выявила нечто необычное, то лишь потому, что это сделали мы. А теперь, если не возражаешь… - Стратмор не договорил, но Чатрукьян понял его без слов.
Ему предложили исчезнуть. - Диагностика, черт меня дери! - бормотал Чатрукьян, направляясь в свою лабораторию.
Ничего не вижу, - пожаловалась. - Включи свет.
Беккер не шелохнулся. Что-то сказанное панком не давало ему покоя. Я прихожу сюда каждый вечер. А что, если этот парень способен ему помочь.
- Прошу прощения, - сказал .
- Увы, в мире полно наивных людей, которые не могут представить себе ужасы, которые нас ждут, если мы будем сидеть сложа руки. Я искренне верю, что только мы можем спасти этих людей от их собственного невежества. Сьюзан не совсем понимала, к чему он клонит. Коммандер устало опустил глаза, затем поднял их вновь. - Сьюзан, выслушай меня, - сказал он, нежно ей улыбнувшись. - Возможно, ты захочешь меня прервать, но все же выслушай до конца.
Хейл продолжал взывать к ней: - Я отключил Следопыта, подумав, что ты за мной шпионишь. Заподозрила, что с терминала Стратмора скачивается информация, и вот-вот выйдешь на. Правдоподобно, но маловероятно.